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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
Putin's Soul 
In an address to the justice ministry board at the end of last month, acting 
President Vladimir Putin pointed out that the machinery of state was "neglected, 
rickety and disorderly," and prescribed the creation of a "strong" state, defined as 
one which "upholds the rights and freedoms of the individual." (ITAR-TASS, 1025 
& 1028 GMT, 31 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0131, via World News Connection) 
 
Putin further criticized the legislative chaos created by the melding of Soviet-era 
and post-Soviet laws, and called for a renovation of the legal framework to be 
facilitated by the judiciary. 
 
These comments, along with some public ruminations on a possible referendum 
on land reform, thus far provide a scant basis for assessing Putin's political 
intentions. Little more is thought to be forthcoming, however, as candidate Putin 
has announced that he will delay issuing his electoral platform for fear of criticism 
of his policies. "As soon as you make it public, they will start gnawing at it and 
tearing it to pieces," Putin claimed. (IZVESTIA, 9 Feb 00; via Johnson's Russia 
List) 
 
Despite the lack of information about his political affiliations, Putin still seems 
quite likely to win the March presidential elections. Earlier this month two 
potential challengers withdrew themselves from the race. Fatherland-All Russia 
leaders Yevgeni Primakov and Yuri Luzhkov both pulled out of the presidential 
poll, with Luzhkov taking a parting shot at Putin. "I am not running against 
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Vladimir Putin...," Luzhkov said, "but I am very worried for Russia's future under 
Putin." (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 2 Feb 00; via C-afp@clari.net) 
 
Luzhkov is not the only leading Russian figure with reservations about Putin's 
stewardship of Russia. As John Thornhill observes in The Financial Times (8 Feb 
00; via lexis-nexis), there is a battle on for Vladimir Putin's political soul and many 
prominent Russian liberals are concerned that they are not winning the struggle. 
Andrei Piontkovsky, who heads the Center for Strategic Studies, observes, 
"People say Putin is the lesser evil but in what units can you measure evil?"  
 
Piontkovsky elaborated on his concerns for a Putin regime by reviewing what 
Putin has undertaken thus far: "Putinism is war, it is national 'consolidation' 
based on hatred towards a particular ethnic group. It is attacks on freedom of 
speech and use of information to create zombies, it is isolation from the outside 
world and further economic degradation." (THE RUSSIAN JOURNAL, 14-20 Feb 
00; via Johnson's Russia List) 
 
The return of Yastrzhembsky 
In compiling his presidential team, Vladimir Putin has, rather unusually, reached 
out to a former Yel'tsin apparatchik (and reputed close adviser) who was abruptly 
dismissed during the government crisis of 1998, following the devaluation of the 
ruble. Sergei Yastrzhembsky, Yel'tsin's press spokesman and a deputy chief of 
his Kremlin staff, has been named by presidential decree to oversee the press 
services of the armed forces, including the Chechen campaign, as well as other 
agencies. (INTERFAX, 1825 GMT, 20 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0120, via World 
News Connection) 
 
The appointment suggests that Putin has a great deal of confidence in 
Yastrzhembsky, as "managing" media coverage of the war in Chechnya has 
been a high priority of his administration and surely will continue to be so at least 
until the presidential elections. Yastrzhembsky was most recently a member of 
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Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov's administration, and his appointment could 
possibly be viewed as conciliatory towards the mayor. It may, however, reveal 
more about the shift of importance in part of the "Family" within the Kremlin. 
Yastrzhembsky's ouster in 1998 was reputed to have been engineered by then-
Chief of Staff Valentin Yumashev and Tatiana Dyachenko. (See EDITORIAL 




The once powerful Kremlin economic manager, Pavel Borodin, seemed headed 
for his long-anticipated fall last month when press reports claimed that Swiss 
authorities had issued a warrant for his arrest in connection with the Mabetex 
corruption investigation. This is a story as muddy and complex as a money-
laundering scheme itself, however, as in the days following the initial reports 
questions quickly surfaced about whether a warrant had been issued, or perhaps 
a secret warrant? Was Borodin to be arrested or merely brought in for 
questioning? Perhaps most crucial to Borodin is the issue of whether his new 
post as secretary of The Belarus-Russian State Council provides him with 
immunity from prosecution. Borodin categorically denied the warrant story: 
"There is no warrant for my arrest...," he said, "This is purely a political 
assassination attempt." (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 0950 PST, 28 Jan 00; via 
C-afp@clari.net) 
 
Putin himself is not unaffected by this development. His Kremlin career did begin, 
after all, in the economic management office as a deputy to Borodin. Dismissing 
Borodin from his Kremlin post was one of Putin's earliest moves as acting 
president, but by ensconcing Borodin at the new State Council, Putin created an 
aura of protection surrounding his former boss. 
 
GOVERNMENT 
Stepashin on war plans 
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It may be that Sergei Stepashin felt a moment of bitterness toward Putin in the 
initial aftermath of the Duma faction clash that produced an alliance between 
Unity and the Communists, but whatever his motivations or regrets he certainly 
dropped a bombshell last month when he confirmed what we long surmised: The 
Chechen war was planned long in advance of the alleged terrorist bombings in 
Moscow. (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 20 Jan 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Stepashin claimed that the decision to invade Chechnya was made in March 
1999 and planned for August-September. Stepashin, who was head of the MVD 
at the time and therefore certainly in a position to know, further claimed that 
Putin, as then-FSB chief, was fully aware of the military planning. While analysts 
within Russia commenting on this development are surprisingly few, there are 
those attempting to explain the ramifications of this information and its impact on 
a determination of the current leadership's character. Respected military analyst 
Pavel Felgenhauer (in the article cited above) warns: "In Chechnya, Putin has 
acted as an irrational warmonger.... It is possible that Putin -- the political 
unknown -- is in fact a Russian version of Milosevic, an aggressive, irresponsible 
nationalist armed with thousands of nuclear warheads."  
 
SECURITY SERVICES 
Where is Babitsky? 
Radio Liberty correspondent Andrei Babitsky has been missing in Chechnya 
since the middle of January. Various sources have claimed since his 
disappearance that he was arrested by Russian forces for aiding Chechen 
rebels, was under house arrest and/or had been traded to Chechen rebels for 
three Russian soldiers. Recently, Federal Security Services Chief Nikolai 
Patrushev weighed in on the case by confirming to reporters that Babitsky was 
alive, but Patrushev would not elaborate on Babitsky's status or whereabouts. "I 
don't know where he is -- that is beyond our department," Patrushev claimed. 
(THE MOSCOW TIMES, 8 Feb 00; via lexis-nexis) 
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Service rallies for elections 
Patrushev also recently held a collegium meeting in order to brief his personnel 
on their role in the conduct of the upcoming presidential elections. (MOSCOW 
NEWS, 26 Jan 00; via lexis-nexis) Patrushev highlighted the need for the FSB to 
target "dirty election technology," which he characterized as "mud slinging, 
illegally obtained facts, information about individuals' private life, and other types 
of sleaze." There were no recorded comments on the penalty for mud slinging, 
but the inherent threat will undoubtedly serve further to chill an already cowed 
media. 
 
The meeting was also attended by Kremlin Chief of Staff Aleksandr Voloshin, 
who asked the service to focus on Article 11 of the Presidential Election Law, 
which deals with foreign influence on an election campaign. Voloshin's comments 
were seen as having a direct effect on media coverage of the Chechen war. 
Should any outlet change its reportage from a "Russian" interpretation to the 
more critical take of foreign media coverage in Chechnya, an investigation of 
foreign influence of that media outlet would surely follow. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Chandler Rosenberger and Sarah Miller 
 
Dr. Albright makes a house call  
Maybe history really has ended: Russian-US relations, at least, seem to be in a 
state of suspended animation. US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's deeply 
pointless trip to Moscow in early February accomplished little that could not have 
been handled by FedEx -- with one caveat. By making a merely symbolic 
appearance in the Russian capital just as the Chechen capital Grozny fell, 




And yet the actions of Russian government recently indicate that history remains 
in motion, if only in reverse. The revelation of Russia's involvement in helping 
Iraq skirt sanctions on its oil, as well as deeper ties to anti-Western governments 
in Asia, hint that the new regime in the Kremlin is reading from a very old 
playbook. 
 
Although they reportedly got along well personally, Albright and Russian Foreign 
Minister Igor Ivanov did little during Albright's recent visit to Moscow but return to 
tiresome go-rounds on Chechnya, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, Kosovo and 
Russia-NATO relations. Nothing of substance was accomplished on any front. 
The only two agreements signed, in fact, were minor: a protocol for how to 
recover American technology if a Russian rocket carrying an American satellite 
failed, and amendments to a previous agreement on monitoring nuclear threats. 
(INTERFAX, 1452 GMT, 27 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0127, via World News 
Connection) 
 
The Chinese are suspected of having stolen American missile guidance systems 
by blowing up such a rocket in 1996 (THE WASHINGTON POST, 8 Jul 98; via 
lexis-nexis), so the new missile security measures were a useful, if belated, 
measure to take. But given that these deals were about as complex as an 
apartment lease, Albright's trip to Moscow was merely symbolic. 
 
Albright's trip, moreover, was symbolic in the worst possible way, undermining 
the weak criticism of the Chechen war that she offered. While in Moscow, 
Albright joined the foreign ministers of Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Tunis, 
Canada, as well as officials from the Palestinian Authority, the European Union, 
Japan, China and Switzerland at meetings on the Middle East question that the 
White House had helped Moscow to sponsor. (ITAR-TASS, 0801 GMT, 1 Feb 
00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0201, via World News Connection) Albright later warned 
that Russia risked international isolation for pursuing its savage war in the 
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Caucasus. (THE WASHINGTON POST, 3 Feb 00; via lexis-nexis) Well, 
apparently not. 
 
Albright arrived in Moscow unsure whether acting Russian President Vladimir 
Putin would be able to find time to meet her, but after a three-hour session with 
him on 3 February she was fulsome with her praise. The former KGB officer, 
Albright said, was "a very well-informed person, a good interlocutor, obviously a 
Russian patriot who seeks a normal position with the West." No, the Secretary of 
State and Putin had not agreed on Chechnya, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 
Kosovo or Russia-NATO relations. But Putin had spoken without using notes. 
 
"What is important," Albright added, "is to judge him by what he does." (THE 
NEW YORK TIMES, 3 Feb 00; via lexis-nexis) Which act had made more of an 
impression on Albright -- Putin's speaking without a script or his prosecution of 
the Chechen war? Prudently reserving judgment, the Secretary of State did not 
say. 
 
Judging him by what he does 
However, her emphasis on Putin's deeds rather than his words seemed 
especially justified after Putin addressed the diplomats gathered for the Middle 
East summit. Putin's struck an accommodating stance that was as remarkable for 
its moderation as it was for its insincerity. 
 
In his first speech on foreign policy since assuming power on New Year's Eve, 
Putin declined to use some of the code words of anti-Westernism that had 
marked Yel'tsin's last years. He did not, for example, refer to Russia's ambition to 
help create a "multipolar world," and insisted instead that "we are not fighting for 
spheres of influence and we are not trying to compete with anyone." Criticism of 
NATO action in Kosovo, usually an explicit part of any Russian foreign policy 
statement, was limited to an oblique commitment to "forming a stable and 
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indivisible Europe built not on the (exercise) of force but on the principles of the 
United Nations (charter)." (UPI, 1258 GMT, 1 Feb 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Instead, Putin insisted that Russia would cooperate with other world powers in 
tackling the problems of international terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, "aggressive separatism" and, in a new theme, the potential for conflict 
emerging from the growing gap between rich and poor nations. "Russia is a 
reliable, constructive and predictable partner in building Big Europe," Putin said. 
"Our policy will remain honest, open and transparent." (INTERFAX, 1019 GMT, 1 
Feb 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0201, via World News Connection) 
 
The difference between Putin's words and deeds became apparent days after his 
talk, however, when US ships enforcing United Nations sanctions against Iraq 
intercepted a Russian tanker suspected of smuggling oil. The tanker had sought 
to evade the UN patrols by hugging the Iranian coast, but was caught off the 
United Arab Emirates as it passed through the Strait of Hormuz. State 
Department spokesman James Foley later said US officials had been warning 
Moscow about the activities of Russian-flagged ships for the previous month. 
(ASSOCIATED PRESS, 1217 EST, 3 Feb 00; via lexis-nexis) Illicit smuggling of 
Iraqi oil, Foley said, had increased sharply since autumn 1998. 
 
Russia's deeper involvement in thwarting the sanctions comes less than a month 
after Moscow forced the UN to appoint its candidate to head the new Iraqi 
weapons inspection team. (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 18 Jan 00) At the same 
time Russia has been pressing for the appointment of new permanent member 
countries to the UN Security Council, and has said it will welcome changes 
among the current rotating members. (INTERFAX, 0908 GMT, 31 Jan 00; FBIS-
SOV-2000-0131, via World News Connection) Russia is Iraq's largest creditor-
nation, and has long sought to end sanctions in order to pursue lucrative 
contracts exploiting its oil reserves. 
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The Russian government denied that the privately owned tanker was smuggling 
but offered to cooperate fully with the investigation of the affair. Rossiyskaya 
gazeta, the government-owned daily, took the opportunity to strike a firmer 
stance against the West. The tanker incident, the paper said, had been sprung 
just after Albright left Moscow as part of a wider plan to "undermine trust in 
Russia" -- just as previous libeling of the Soviet Union had undermined its 
authority. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 8 Feb 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0208, via World 
News Connection) 
 
The seizure of the Russia ship might well have been inspired by the political 
tussle between Russia and the US over sanctions against Iraq, but the marked 
increase in Russian smuggling would seem to put the blame for escalating 
tensions with Russia, not the US. And whether Putin makes explicit reference to 
a "multipolar" world order or not, his actions in the Far East (see below) indicate 
that his government remains committed to building strong military and diplomatic 
ties to Asian nations -- especially China -- with their own grievances about US 
dominance. 
 
The explicit comparison, moreover, of Western criticism of Russia now and its 
previous criticism of the Soviet Union -- published in a government newspaper -- 
indicates how far the Kremlin has slipped back into its old world view. Putin has 
already retired the Yel'tsin nostrum that the Soviet Union was not Russia. His 
foreign policy deeds, if not his words, show the decree to which he also equates 
Russia's orientation in the world with that of the empire it supposedly abandoned. 
 
'Tacit' multipolarism  
Russia's Asia policy got a boost from Deputy Foreign Minister Gregori Karasin on 
8 February in a speech outlining Moscow's three main goals in East Asia. All 
three aims were predictable, focusing on international security, bilateral 
confidence-building and political-economic development. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 8 
Feb 00) Karasin's comments clarified acting President Vladimir Putin's foreign 
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policy speech from 1 February and anticipated Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov's 
East Asia trip this week.  
 
In his speech, Putin omitted any mention of Russia's "multipolar policy," which 
has guided Russia's attempts to improve relations with non-Western countries 
over the past few years. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 2 Feb 00) However, 
Karasin's remarks a week later reveal that, despite Putin's omission, little change 
is likely in Russia's Asia policy. Putin may indulge in fewer rhetorical flourishes as 
he attempts to establish himself as a competent statesman in the runup to the 
presidential election; however, that should not be mistaken for a genuine shift in 
Russia's Asia policy. It seems that a newly reinvigorated "tacit multipolarism" may 
pick up where the previous government's largely successful "multipolar policy" 
left off. 
 
In this context, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov's trip to North Korea (DPRK), Japan 
and Vietnam this week indicates Russia's renewed energy for tackling issues that 
were shelved due to Yel'tsin's illnesses and the urgency of other concerns such 
as Kosovo and Chechnya. During his stay in the DPRK, Ivanov will sign the new 
Russia-DPRK Friendship and Cooperation Treaty which has been on hold since 
last spring when Karasin initialed it in Pyongyang. (REUTERS, 7 Feb 00; via 
RussiaToday.com) Russian relations with the DPRK were strained in the early 
1990s by Russia's warming ties with South Korea, but the new treaty and a good 
trip for Ivanov will signal an improvement in relations. In addition to the bilateral 
benefits of warming relations with the DPRK, better ties will suit Russia's long-
term diplomatic goals on the peninsula. For some time Russia has expressed 
interest in six-way talks to conclude a peace treaty between North and South 
Korea. Russian involvement in arranging peace talks on the peninsula would be 
a timely diplomatic gain for Moscow, and the new Friendship Treaty is the first 
step towards this goal.  
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Although the Kurile Islands and peace treaty issues remain unresolved with the 
Japanese, Ivanov's trip may yield more results than his trip to Tokyo last spring. 
This may be due to the more pragmatic approach that Russia has been taking 
towards Japan. At this point, these two subjects continue to plague relations 
since Japan still hinges the Russo-Japanese peace treaty on the resolution of the 
Kurile Islands issue, while Russia is unwilling to give up its control over the 
islands. Although these obstacles, as well as US National Missile Defense plans, 
have thwarted Russo-Japanese relations in the past, Ivanov's trip will likely focus 
on the more positive aspects of Russo-Japanese relations such as economic 
cooperation. Japan remains Asia's economic powerhouse and provided Russia 
with much-needed loans even after the Asian financial collapse, when other 
lenders refused. Although Ivanov and his Japanese counterpart inevitably will 
discuss the outstanding territorial issues, Russia seems prepared to intensify 
relations in other realms. This decision will not solve the problems in Russo-
Japanese relations, but for the time being it will give Russia an opportunity to 
strengthen important economic ties. (ITAR-TASS, 0929 GMT, 28 Jan 00; FBIS-
SOV-2000-0128, via World News Connection)  
 
Economics have been the driving force behind Russia's relations with Vietnam 
for some time. Beginning with arms sales, Russia has sought out profitable deals 
with the Vietnamese that are now expanding into the energy and technology 
sectors. According to the Vietnamese, Russia is their country's eighth largest 
investor, but several new projects may propel Russia to the top of the list in the 
near future. In addition to the bilateral economic situation, Ivanov's visit will 
prepare the grounds for April's ASEAN business forum, at which Russian 
companies will have a chance to meet with ASEAN members. (ITAR-TASS, 1907 
GMT, 3 Feb 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0203, via World News Connection)  
 
None of these developments should surprise Western politicians, since Russia 
has openly warned the West of its intentions in Asia for months. Now that a new, 
healthier leadership seems poised to replace formally the old, ailing one, Russia 
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appears to be revitalizing its Asia policy. For some time, Russia's multipolar 
policy has focused on increasing and improving Russian partnerships in Asia. In 
light of Russia's increasingly frail relations with the West, it is natural that Russia 
pursues these economic and security partnerships. But even though there are 
economic benefits to be had, Karasin's remarks and Russia's current 
international situation suggest that geopolitics remain the driving force behind 
Putin's "tacit multipolarism." As such, the major thrust of the policy seems aimed 
at the West. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Media 
By Jonathan Solomon 
 
The real information war 
In 1999, being an independent journalist in Russia was hardly the safest of 
professions. Twelve journalists were murdered last year and many more were 
assaulted, according to Alexei Simonov, president of the Fund for Defense of 
Glasnost. (ITAR-TASS, 2129 GMT, 12 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0113, via World 
News Connection) On the night of 29 November 99, unknown assailants severely 
battered Igor Rostov, general director of the Kaskad TV and radio company of 
Kaliningrad. In a letter to Interior Minister Vladimir Rushailo and Acting 
Prosecutor General Vladimir Ustinov protesting the attack, the president of the 
National TV and Radio Association, Eduard Sagalaev, directly linked the incident 
to the Duma campaigns. "Against the complicated background of the election 
campaign, correspondents and chiefs of regional mass media bodies daily 
become a direct object of pressure and threats on the part of persons carrying 
out the dirty political struggle," Sagalaev declared. (ITAR-TASS, 1535 GMT, 3 
Dec 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-1204, via World News Connection) 
 
Many press offices came under attack as well. On 1 December, the Interfax 
agency reportedly received a bomb threat just prior to a press conference with 
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Anatoly Chubais and Union of Right Wing Forces leader Sergei Kirienko. The 
agency received a nearly identical threat the next day as well. While the occasion 
gave Interfax the opportunity to declare that the news agency has "never been 
and will never be politically engaged," it was typical of attempts by varying 
factions to exert physical pressure in efforts to influence the mass media's 
reporting, as well as who they let speak. (INTERFAX, 1130 GMT, 2 Dec 99; 
FBIS-SOV-1999-1203, via World News Connection) 
 
The situation deteriorates the farther away from Moscow one travels. In the 
Maritime Krai, a feed cable of the radio station Lemma, which gave a voice to 
opponents of the region's governor, was cut in December. There one must 
receive 14 separate authorizations to set up a mere newspaper stand, while in 
Sakhalin the government demands four, which almost seems fair in comparison! 
Most regions are lucky if they have an independent news outlet, and it must be 
considered that the majority of printing presses and broadcast centers which the 
independent media in Russia use are leased from the state. (OBSHCHAYA 
GAZETA, 9 Dec 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-1209, via World News Connection)  
 
And you complained about campaign mudslinging in New Hampshire? 
Whereas some used violence, or at least the threat of it, to affect coverage of the 
campaigns, the oligarchs and the blocs relied on other means. On 3 December, 
Moscow's Mayor and Fatherland-All Russia (OVR) leader Yuri Luzhkov won a 
libel lawsuit against Boris Berezovsky's state-managed ORT TV network and one 
of its prominent anchors, Sergei Dorenko. ORT was forced to pay 50,000 rubles 
and Dorenko R100,000 due to the "moral damage" done to the mayor. (ITAR-
TASS, 1915 GMT, 3 Dec 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-1203, via World News Connection) 
But strangely (or not so strangely) enough, three days later reports surfaced that 
Dorenko had been appointed deputy director general of ORT. For its part, ORT 
neither confirmed nor denied the apparent promotion. (INTERFAX, 1612 GMT, 6 
Dec 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-1206, via World News Connection) But the propaganda 
attacks by those in the Kremlin's pocket were seemingly successful in propelling 
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the Unity bloc to victory over OVR. Berezovsky, by then a newly elected Duma 
representative, openly declared that Dorenko "is an indefinitely talented person," 
and that Dorenko's actions bore "a plus rather than a minus sign. Dorenko's role 
was enormous." (INTERFAX, 1102 GMT, 22 Dec 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-1222, via 
World News Connection) 
 
From 28 November through the election, the European Institute for the Media, 
under the auspices of the OSCE, monitored the press coverage of the 
campaigns. According to the institute's Gillian McCormack, OVR "and its leaders, 
Yevgeny Primakov and Yuri Luzhkov, received the most negative coverage of 
any party during the campaign." She declared the pro-Kremlin ORT and RTR 
networks "the worst offenders," and noted that the media war was fiercest 
between Berezovsky's Kremlin-allied outlets and Vladimir Gusinsky's OVR-allied 
outlets. Stations owned by both blatantly promoted their respective blocs in 
reports that aired under the pretense of being actual news pieces, according to 
McCormack.  
 
McCormack took ORT and the RTR network to task for several reasons. First, as 
they had the "greatest national audience reach, (they) had a particular 
responsibility to provide impartial information about the political choice on offer to 
the electorate." Their coverage, heavily biased against OVR and for Unity, "failed 
to meet standards set in Russian law and in international agreements and 
conventions signed by the Russian Federation." Feeding off Vladimir Putin's 
popularity, the networks would often combine coverage of his actions in 
government with that of Unity's campaigning. She noted that Dorenko's Sunday 
night news analysis program on ORT was the most popular such program in 
Russia leading up to the election, and condemned him for using "his position to 
call Luzhkov everything from a supporter of evil sects to a murderer." 
 
In McCormack's opinion, the problems of the Russian media stem from the 
nature of their ownership and the absence of political interest in protecting 
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journalists, not to mention a general lack of journalistic ethics, integrity and depth. 
Indeed, she observed that "the absence of any real analysis of the Chechen 
conflict" is partly the cause of its high popularity among Russians, not to mention 
the fact that this popularity directly transferred to Putin and Unity. (MOSCOW 
TIMES, 29 Dec 99; via lexis-nexis) It must seem absolutely ludicrous, then, that 
Putin "expressed hope that journalists will do their utmost to ensure an 'honest 
and clean' campaign" in the March presidential race. (ITAR-TASS, 1211 GMT, 13 
Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0113, via World News Connection) 
 
Trouble at NTV 
Heaven forbid anyone should question the speed of Putin's rise to power and 
popularity or his background! The "Voice of the People" program on Gusinsky's 
NTV did just this, and received the wrath of state-run media as a result. In an 
editorial shortly afterward, Rossiyskaya gazeta implied that those on NTV who 
questioned Putin were "yesterday's men, who still dream of returning the country 
to its 'radiant past.'" Indeed, why should these issues "be discussed in the 
premier's absence, if he demonstrates day in, day out his openness and 
readiness to give public replies to the most pointed of questions?" 
(ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 20 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0120, via World News 
Connection) 
 
On 21 January, NTV co-founder and general director Oleg Dobrodeev resigned 
without expressing a reason. Yevgeny Kiselev, chairman of the board of NTV 
and host of the "Itogi" program, took his place. The move was interpreted by the 
Moscow media as indication of "deep disturbances among television 
management as a result of political pressures associated with the election 
season and Chechen campaign." According to the St. Petersburg Times, a 
Western-owned English-language paper, Izvestia television critic Irina 
Petrovskaya interviewed Gusinsky at NTV's sixth birthday party. Gusinsky 
claimed that he and Dobrodeev were disagreeing over the coverage of 
Chechnya, and that he, himself, had insisted that NTV "not be a mouthpiece for 
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the Defense Ministry and that it report the tragedy of refugees and civilians as 
well as the military successes." Dobrodeev did not attend the party. 
 
The Moscow media viewed Gusinsky's assertions cynically. Dobrodeev was the 
one who was pushing for more balanced coverage, they felt. At a press 
conference on 19 December, Dobrodeev appeared depressed by the partisan 
journalism during the Duma campaigns, saying "All television channels came out 
of this election campaign with huge losses to their reputations. I can only hope 
that we at NTV managed to minimalize them." Manana Alslamzian of Internews 
Russia summed up the concerns of the press: "Who will replace such people and 
how much lower will the ethical standards of our journalism drop?" (ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES, 21 Jan 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
A sign of things to come? 
What began as a freedom of the press issue has become the telling indicator of 
whether glasnost is truly dead under a Putin government. On 23 January, Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty reporter Andrei Babitsky was arrested because he 
"broke the rules set for correspondents in the area of the anti-terrorist operation," 
according to acting Prosecutor General Ustinov. In Ustinov's 31 January 
announcement, he stated that Babitsky would remain incarcerated for at least the 
next 10 days. (INTERFAX, 1117 GMT, 31 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0131, via 
World News Connection)  
 
However, on 3 February the Russian government reported that he was traded to 
"Chechen rebels" for some Russian soldiers. The exchange was videotaped by 
members of the FSB, and aired on Russian television. An FSB spokesman 
confirmed on NTV that his service had made the tape, but said that "the question 
of the journalist's freeing and turning over should be addressed to the 
prosecutor's office and military command. The Russian Federal Security Service 
did not institute a criminal case, did not detain Andrei Babitsky, and had no 
relation to his detention and to what happened later." He added that the only 
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reason that the FSB made the videotape was that an "FSB worker proved to be 
the only one who had a video camera." (ITAR-TASS, 0839 GMT, 4 Feb 00; FBIS-
SOV-2000-0204, via World News Connection) And just what was an FSB worker 
doing at the exchange of a Russian national with "terrorists," especially when the 
service "had no relation" to the affair at all?  
 
Also on 4 February, reports circulated that the transfer had occurred at Babitsky's 
request. Sergei Yastrzhembsky, the Kremlin's spokesman on the Chechen War, 
displayed a copy of an agreement that Babitsky had supposedly signed to 
authorize the exchange. (MOSCOW TIMES, 4 Feb 00; via lexis-nexis) First 
Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff Colonel General Valery Manilov 
commented at a press conference that "it would be okay, and even worth talking 
of gratitude or even an award, if there's no dark side to the question, which has 
been expressed by Andrei's willingness to go to the militants." (INTERFAX, 1447 
GMT, 4 Feb 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0204, via World News Connection) The 
possibility of gratitude for such a "criminal" as Babitsky?  
 
Defense Minister Igor Sergeev had harsher words. "Babitsky is not [Arnold] 
Schwarzenegger and he's not a banker, so they must have valued him for his 
information, which suggests that the information he had been supplying was not 
always objective, mildly speaking .... I'd trade 10 Babitskys for one Russian 
soldier," Sergeev said in an interview on ORT. (MOSCOW TIMES, 4 Feb 00; via 
lexis-nexis) 
 
According to the Moscow Times, the sister paper of the St. Petersburg Times, 
Babitsky was one of the few reporters whose coverage of the war ran contrary to 
the rosy picture put forth by the government-controlled media. It seems likely, 
then, that Babitsky's reports contained too much truth for someone in Moscow, 
and he was silenced.  
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Babitsky's wife was justifiably enraged and frightened. In an interview on 3 
February, she related that the government had not let her talk with him at all prior 
to the exchange. "I don't even know if he is OK. If Yastrzhembsky says he's OK, I 
don't believe him. I don't believe that Yastrzhembsky." (MOSCOW TIMES, 4 Feb 
00; via lexis-nexis) Do we? 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
DUMA 
16 Duma deputies left without party affiliation 
Among others, Roman Abramovich, Boris Berezovsky, Nikolai Gonchar, Mikhail 
Gutseriev, Alexander Korzhakov, Anatoly Kulikov and Nikolai Ryzhkov, have yet 
to announce to which party they will adhere. 
 
Although the numbers fluctuate, the Communist Party will be the largest single 
faction in the Third Duma with 93 seats. The second largest party, Unity, has 81 
deputies. Fatherland-All Russia has 46 deputies, the Union of Rightist Forces 
has 32 and YABLOKO has 21 deputies. The Liberal Democratic Party faction will 
be the smallest group with 17 members. 
 
In addition to those parties that ran for office, there are three parliamentary 
factions: People's Deputy [sic] with 58 members, Russian Regions Group (the 
Union of Independent Deputies) with 39 members, and the Agro-Industrial 
Deputy Group with 37 members. (ITAR-TASS, 1919 GMT, 21 Jan 00; FBIS-
SOV-2000-0121, via World News Connection) 
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The numbers Itar-Tass provides, when tallied, do not actually add up to 450, the 
number of members of the Duma. The discrepancy comes from the districts 
where elections were annulled due to too many votes in opposition to all the 
candidates and the vacancy of the Chechen Republic seat.  
 
Opposition boycott ends 
The Union of Rightist Forces, YABLOKO, and Fatherland-All Russia, whose 
members walked out of the Duma during its first session in protest of a collusive 
agreement between the CPRF and Unity, have returned. However, the three 
factions have as yet to take up the deputy speaker posts allotted to them. (BBC 
World News, 1131 CET, 9 Feb 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
The question remains whether the three parties will continue their coordination in 
opposition to the CPRF/Unity alliance. It is difficult to know for sure, although two 
recent developments suggest continued cooperation is unlikely. First, YABLOKO 
broke ranks and began negotiations with Unity prior to the opposition parties' 
return. Second, almost everyone in the Duma "supports" acting President 
Vladimir Putin, and by extension his Unity party. It appears that the imminent 
election of Putin to the presidency has made the parties that might have opposed 
him reluctant to do so, perhaps wanting to participate in the division of spoils 
after election day. 
 
REGIONS 
Chechen process of 'normalization' begins 
It was only to be expected. Moscow is now beginning to reconstitute Chechnya 
as a region of the federation. Recently, a Chechen State Council was set up in 
Gudermes, tasked with the coordination of the area's re-building. (INTERFAX, 
1017 GMT, 5 Feb 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0205, via World News Connection) 
 
Additionally, Chechens are to receive Russian passports. Over 100,000 blank 
passports are being sent to the police in "liberated" areas of Chechnya. The new 
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passports will be issued first to schoolchildren aged 14 and older, as well as 
persons who have temporary identification cards. (ITAR-TASS, 1351 GMT, 6 Feb 
00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0206, via World News Connection) 
 
And finally, Chechens will be allowed to vote for the next Russian president. 
Alexandr Veshnyakov, chairman of Russia's Central Electoral Commission 
(CEC), discussed the setting up of the Electoral Commission of the Chechen 
Republic (ECCR) which will be given the same power as similar commissions in 
Russia's other regions. Along with elections at the federal level, the ECCR is 
empowered to coordinate the holding of regional referenda as well as to prepare 
and hold elections to regional governing bodies. Veshnyakov also noted that until 
Chechnya has erected its own governing bodies, the process will be run from 
Moscow. (ITAR-TASS, 1341 GMT, 1 Feb 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0201, via World 
News Connection) 
 
It is going to take more than bricks, mortar, and elections to rebuild Chechnya 
and its relations with Russia. As the Chechen rebels withdraw into the mountains 
in the south of the republic, Moscow may claim victory for now, but winning the 
peace may be something else entirely. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By LCDR James Duke Jr. And Lt. Col. Jill Skelton 
 
Russian arms industry's long-term prognosis 
Russia's arms industry is buzzing with excitement. Acting President Vladimir 
Putin approved a $2.18 billion defense procurement budget on 27 January, which 
represents a 50-percent increase from 1999. Conventional weapons will receive 
higher priority at the expense of nuclear forces, which consumed 80 percent of 
the procurement budget last year. (MOSCOW TIMES, 28 Jan 00; via Center for 
Defense Information Russia Weekly, No. 86) Russia's deputy prime minister, Ilya 
 21 
Klebanov, who oversees Russian arms sales abroad, rashly predicts Russia will 
sell $4 billion of Russian weapons in 2000. This would surpass the $3.5 billion 
1999 figure, a record in the post-Soviet era. (AFP, 8 Feb 00; via Johnson's 
Russia List) Some may believe Russia's arms industry, which has been starved 
for funds since 1991, is on the road to prosperity. 
 
However, Russia's defense sector still has a rough future. The 50-percent 
procurement budget increase was due to a reallocation of funds, not an overall 
increase in the defense budget. (THE NIS OBSERVED, 1 Feb 00) If past history 
is any indication, the defense ministry will be fortunate to receive full funding. 
Despite Klebanov's promises to pay all arrears, the ministry received only 60 
percent of funds for the 1999 budget. This is better than 1998, when only 12 
percent of the procurement budget was funded. (MOSCOW TIMES, 28 Jan 00; 
via Center for Defense Information Russia Weekly, No. 86)  
 
Russia's predicted arms export boom is just an optimistic forecast. Recent 
reports indicate Russia may be returning to Soviet-era plan targets. Russia's 
three main arms trading companies --Rosvooruzhenie, Promeksport, and 
Rossiyskie Technologi -- will be compelled by the government to "demonstrate 
convincingly exactly how they are planning to fulfill the declared plans." Some 
Western analysts have painted a less than rosy picture of Russia's arms exports. 
They highlight lost market shares in Eastern Europe and the fact that many 
former Soviet client states are too poor to purchase Russian weapons. Some 
experts even predict an eventual decline in Russia's lucrative arrangement with 
China and India as the two buyers increasingly move towards producing their 
own weapons or look to other suppliers. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 7 
Feb 00) 
 
Russia's defense industry problems are far from over. The industry owes recent 
successes to technological advances made during the Soviet era. The collapse 
of state funding has halted development of any new discoveries, and many 
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engineers have left the defense sector for more lucrative positions in the banking 
and trade industries. The loss of engineering talent may be a root cause of recent 
quality problems. Sukhoi, one of Russia's leading aircraft manufacturers, suffered 
some serious setbacks in 1999 when a new Su-27 purchased by Ethiopia 
crashed. Five months later an Su-30 crashed at the Paris air show. India has 
suspended negotiations over the purchase of 300 T-90 tanks and a 
manufacturing license after the production model performed poorly during trials. 
(AFP, 8 Feb 00; via Johnson's Russia List)  
 
The prognosis for Russia's arms industry is not good. The 2000 defense budget 
and arms export plan are desperate government measures to prevent a complete 
collapse of the arms industry and the associated political fallout. 
 
All indications are that the dominoes will keep falling 
The shake-up of the Russian military leadership is continuing. In the last two 
months acting President Putin has replaced two senior field commanders in 
Chechnya and the commander-in-chief of the interior ministry troops. Now there 
are rumors that the replacement of military leaders has reached the highest 
levels -- Defense Minister Igor Sergeev and, by extension, those officers close to 
him.  
 
It is anticipated that Putin will, shortly after the presidential elections, move 
quickly to replace the senior leadership in the top echelons of the armed forces. 
This decision will include the defense minister, probably the chief of the General 
Staff, and possibly, commanders of the various service branches. (DEFENSE 
AND SECURITY, 26 Jan 00; Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 8 Feb 00)  
 
Reasons for these anticipated changes should not come as a surprise. Putin has 
not been pleased with the military reforms instituted over the last two and a half 
years. Sergeev has met calls for much-needed reforms with largely superficial 
actions, primarily supporting improvements in the Strategic Rocket Forces -- all 
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at the expense of the disintegrating conventional forces. Corruption is pervasive 
and increasingly threatens to rent the fabric of military discipline and capabilities 
permanently. According to most reports, the maltreatment of troops is rampant. 
Finally, Putin must consider his political future and decide whether it would be 
advantageous, once he wins the elections, for him to leave in place those 
Yel'tsin-appointed senior military officers to whom he owes much of his success 
to date, since they could call in their markers at any time. As evidenced in the 
current Chechen War, Russian military leaders have shown an increasing 
willingness to use their weight in presenting demands of the political leadership. 
 
Two main contenders for the defense minister position most often mentioned are 
the current chief of the General Staff, army General Anatoly Kvashnin, and 
chairman of the Duma's Defense Committee, retired General Andrei Nikolaev. 
General Kvashnin was appointed by Yel'tsin in May 1997 and has been 
described as an "effective ... backroom operator whose political skills may 
exceed his abilities as a commander." (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 8 Feb 
00) He is considered the author not only of the deployment of Russian 
peacekeepers into Kosovo but also of the aggressive military strategy in 
Chechnya. It is rumored that Kvashnin and Putin have developed a close working 
relationship. It is also claimed that the two men struck a deal last September in 
which Kvashnin promised a military victory in Chechnya that would insure Putin's 
popularity and political success. In return, Putin would approve a large increase 
in the military budget and essentially a free hand for the military in their conduct 
of the Chechen War. (GLOBE AND MAIL, 3 Feb 00; via lexis-nexis) This 
apparent close working relationship and Kvashnin's support of Putin's objectives 
in Chechnya would bode well for Kvashnin's selection as the next defense 
minister. However, many experts feel that Kvashnin's star has passed its zenith. 
Also, once Putin is president, Kvashnin could prove to be a political liability: He 
represents the "old" establishment; and, if Russia declares the Chechen War a 
victory, then Kvashnin holds one of Putin's IOUs.  
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More and more talked about as a successor to Sergeev is retired Russian 
General Andrei Nikolaev. He is a former first deputy chief of the General Staff, 
and is currently the chairman of the Duma's Defense Committee. He was 
reportedly considered in 1997 by Yel'tsin for the position of chief of the General 
Staff. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 8 Feb 00) Nikolaev is said to share 
Putin's ideas on military reforms and has a connection to the Federal Security 
Services as former commander of the Border Troops -- a plus on Putin's list. He 
is a long-time opponent to the reforms advocated by Sergeev, saying that they 
address only the mechanics of reducing the armed forces rather than the 
necessary reevaluation of basic roles and missions. His views on Chechnya are 
also said to be very close to Putin's. Sources close to Nikolaev say that, when 
Putin was forming his Chechen policy, he took Nikolaev's views as his starting 
point. (DEFENSE AND SECURITY, 26 Jan 00) However, like Kvashnin, he is 
considered a political animal with ambitions and political loyalties, and a 
penchant for confrontations.  
 
So who is it to be, Kvashnin or Nikolaev, or somebody else out there still unseen 
in the wings? Nobody is a clear winner. Most analysts are still trying to figure 
Putin out and he is holding his cards pretty much to his chest.  
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Sarah Miller 
 
Going, going, GUUAM 
In the flurry surrounding the CIS Moscow summit in late January, GUUAM never 
surfaced. GUUAM, an "economic" grouping of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, 
Azerbaijan, and Moldova, has been a second "pole" in the CIS against Russia's 
dominance ever since it first emerged as GUAM in 1996. But as of late January 
2000, GUUAM's influence in the CIS seemed nonexistent, as its members one by 
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one acquiesced to Russia's dominance in the CIS. (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 1 
Feb 00)  
 
If GUUAM is disintegrating, then it is doing so with barely a whimper. The first 
evidence of the alliance's potential demise as a CIS bloc was the cancellation of 
the GUUAM defense ministers' meeting scheduled for the CIS summit sidelines. 
(ITAR-TASS, 1408 GMT, 30 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0130, via World News 
Connection) The cancellation was quietly announced by the Russian news 
service ITAR-TASS several days after the Moscow summit. None of the GUUAM 
presidents or defense ministers made any public comments about the 
cancellation. The events at the summit indicate that CIS member states will place 
bilateral concerns with Russia above all else, instead of strengthening the one 
organization that gave them a voice in the CIS. Even if GUUAM doesn't entirely 
disintegrate, its future as a bloc in the CIS is doomed if its members do nothing to 
revive it. Unfortunately, GUUAM members face a difficult situation: Independently 
they are vulnerable; together, they invoke Russia's suspicion. But with no 
international assistance to help them maintain their independence, GUUAM and 
all CIS member states are forced to follow Russia's rules. This is precisely the 
scenario that played out at the CIS summit in January. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Showdown at the OK Corral  
In what seems like a scene out of an old cowboy movie, 100 members of the pro-
presidential parliamentary majority burst into the parliament chamber last week, 
taking control of the speaker's rostrum and the power that goes with it. Despite 
their valiant attempts, members of the leftist minority -- formerly the majority -- 
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were unable to beat back the invaders. After a few scuffles, order was as 
restored to the degree possible, given the circumstances.  
 
As previously reported in The NIS Observed, the parliamentary standoff broke 
out on 21 January when then-Speaker Oleksandr Tkachenko would not initiate a 
vote on a proposal to oust him and Deputy Speaker Adam Martynyuk. The vote 
had been requested by the newly formed pro-presidential majority. Majority 
members then attempted to approach the speaker's rostrum, and, when blocked, 
walked out of the chamber. (INTELNEWS, 20 Jan 00; BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) They held an alternative session the next day in a 
nearby exhibition center, where they voted to remove Tkachenko and Martynyuk.  
 
At the same time, Tkachenko and members of the four leftist parties supporting 
him set up 24-hour shifts to guard the parliament chamber against the entry of 
any "centrists," while calling on the international community to come to the aid of 
"democracy." Tkachenko had claimed that the vote to oust him was 
unconstitutional because it was held without his consent, and because a quorum 
consisted not of a majority, but of 300 members. (ITAR-TASS, 2105 GMT, 4 Feb 
00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0204, via World News Connection) While the latter claim 
was dubious and quickly dropped, the former may in fact have merit. Tkachenko 
and his allies have asked the Constitutional Court to examine whether a vote can 
be held if not called for by the presiding speaker. The court will undoubtedly also 
look at the question of whether a speaker has the right to block a vote to remove 
him if it is supported by a majority of members, as this one was. 
 
Regardless, after fighting their way into the chamber, lawmakers began securing 
the area. "We knew that more leftists would come to the parliament at about eight 
o'clock, so we had to act quickly," parliament member Taras Stetskiv told 
Reuters. (REUTERS, 8 Feb 00; via RFE/RL NEWSLINE) Leftist members 
responded by calling rival lawmakers "thieves." "This is sheer banditry," 
Communist leader Petro Symonenko said. "They seized the session hall and 
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paramilitary guards are everywhere." (REUTERS, 8 Feb 00; via America Online) 
He did not explain, however, how the actions of the pro-presidential group 
differed from the actions of the leftist group members who seized the chamber in 
the first place. 
 
As things settled down, the majority began discussing a few of the less-pressing 
economic and agricultural reforms suggested by President Leonid Kuchma, while 
leftists jeered and shouted. 
 
Not surprisingly, by the following day most of the shouting had quieted down. 
Although they were quieter, however, minority members continued to refuse to 
register for the parliamentary sessions until finally succumbing to the inevitable 
on 15 February. The parliament passed a zero deficit FY2000 budget on 17 
February which should unclog the country's suspended loan tranches from the 
middle of the IMF and World Bank pipelines. The government has also initiated a 
massive debt restructuring to forestall default this year, and will need investors to 
have faith in a stable government if the restructuring is to work. 
 
While all of this infighting takes place between the two factions in parliament, 
President Leonid Kuchma sits above it, looking down as he reels in the power. 
Kuchma is still planning to hold a referendum asking voters for permission to 
dissolve the parliament, change its format from unicameral to bicameral, limit the 
immunity of deputies, and cut the number of deputies from 450 to 300. As voters 
watch this fiasco on the nightly news, they must wonder why Kuchma didn't hold 
a referendum sooner. The new majority undoubtedly understands that the future 
political lives of its members may depend on its ability to form a stable, efficient 
parliament, and most of all, on its ability to work with the president. The majority 
must understand that Kuchma now holds all the cards. The only question that 
remains is how far Kuchma will go in his consolidation of power. He now stands 
at the threshold of autocracy. The parliament and the crises engulfing his country 
have handed Kuchma the chance to dictate. Will he use his growing political 
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power to force the parliament to bend to his every whim, or will he step back and 
allow the legislative system to work as it is intended? Will he work constructively 
with the newly constructed parliament, or will he continue to rule by decree and 
sound bite? With an obstructionist leftist parliament, Kuchma had every excuse 
to use his power to rule autocratically. Without that parliament, the excuses are 
gone. The coming months will show what type of president, and what type of 
person, Leonid Kuchma really is.  
 
MOLDOVA 
Reality check  
It has now been almost three months since news came from the Istanbul OSCE 
summit that Russia had agreed to remove it troops and weaponry from Dniestr 
by the end of 2002. The so-called agreement was much-heralded in diplomatic 
and media circles, as evidenced by its coverage in the press. 
 
"Russia agrees to reduce troops in Georgia, Moldova," trumpeted the Reuters 
headline. "[Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov] reached agreements with 
Georgia and Moldova to withdraw Russian forces from their territories in coming 
years," explained The New York Times. "If there had not been Western pressure 
over Chechnya," said one unnamed "senior Western diplomat," "the Russians 
would no doubt have continued to procrastinate on these two issues [Moldova 
and Georgia]." (AGENCE PRESSE-FRANCE, 1723 GMT, 19 Nov 99; via lexis-
nexis) And, most significantly, the Istanbul Summit Declaration stated, "We 
welcome the commitment by the Russian Federation to complete withdrawal of 
the Russian forces from the territory of Moldova by the end of  
2002."  
 
My, how the bloom has come off the rose. Less than three months later, Russia 
has entirely backtracked on its commitment. The backstepping began in earnest 
shortly after the new year was rung in, and there was nothing ambiguous about 
the step. In a letter to the Tiraspol administration released on 4 January to 
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Basapres, Russia's foreign ministry explained, "Parallel to our commitment of a 
military withdrawal from Moldova before 2002, which we assumed during the 
OSCE summit in Istanbul [in November 99], Russia remains on its stance that 
the process of withdrawal of the troops and weapons must be accompanied by a 
political resolution to the Dniestr conflict. Thus, the term of withdrawal has a 
second meaning: the final political resolution of the Dniestr crisis." (BASAPRES, 
1900 GMT, 4 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0104, via World News Connection)  
 
Later in January, Dniestr authorities refused a US request to allow an inspection 
of Russia's former 14th Army arsenals, even though at the Istanbul summit 
Russia had agreed to allow such inspections. "The military property of the 
Russian troops is the property of the former USSR and therefore belongs to the 
people of the Dniester region," the leader of the breakaway republic, Igor 
Smirnov, said. "We see no reason for evaluating this property by a foreign 
mission." (ITAR-TASS, 1526 GMT, 19 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0119, via World 
News Connection) Not long after, a delegation of Spanish military experts arrived 
to inspect the arsenals in Dniestr only to be refused access by Smirnov's 
authorities. (BASAPRES, 1900 GMT, 27 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0127, via 
World News Connection) Shockingly, there was no attempt by Russia to mediate 
the inspection stalemate. 
 
The head of the OSCE mission in Chisinau, William Hill, then "warned" Russia 
about missing the agreed-upon deadline and said he "hoped" all agreements 
would be fulfilled. (ITAR-TASS, 1424 GMT, 17 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0117, via 
World News Connection) Although Russia did not respond to this comment, it did 
reiterate its readiness to accept US money to remove the troops. On 4 February, 
a US delegation led by State Department envoy Craig Downkerley arrived in 
Chisinau to "put pressure on the Moldovan Dniestr Republic," and to discuss the 
United States' monetary contribution toward the withdrawal of Russian troops. 
"We informed the guests how the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty is 
being implemented," Lieutenant-General Valery Yevnevich, the commander of 
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Russian troops in the region, said. "We told them about expenses necessary to 
take Russian arms out of the region in accordance with OSCE decisions." 
(BASAPRES, 1900 GMT, 5 Feb 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0205, via World News 
Connection) On 1 February the delegation had met with other OSCE and 
Russian military representatives to discuss the Dniestr issue. "The military 
experts got down to specific issues on the basis of information prepared by the 
Russian Defense Ministry," the Russian foreign ministry told ITAR-TASS. (ITAR-
TASS, 2048 GMT, 3 Feb 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0203, via World News Connection) 
Ministry representatives undoubtedly did not readily discuss the fact that no 
weapons have been removed from the Transdniestr region since the days before 
the OSCE summit. But, they must have explained the situation satisfactorily. 
Neither the OSCE nor the US delegates had one negative word to say about the 
situation after the meeting. And the same media outlets that wrote eloquently 
about the agreement to remove Russian troops have expressed nary a peep 




Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
ARMENIA 
Is Yerevan ready for new talks? 
In the last several weeks the US and Russia have launched separate efforts to 
reinvigorate the negotiations over Nagorno-Karabakh which stalled in the wake of 
the 27 October assassinations of leading Armenian politicians. Special adviser to 
the US secretary of state on newly independent states, Stephen Sestanovich, 
and the US cochairman of the OSCE Minsk Group, Carey Cavanaugh, traveled 
to the region in late January to introduce proposals for new meetings in the 
OSCE Minsk group framework. (SNARK, 1235 GMT, 22 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-
2000-0124, via World News Connection) However, it was Vladimir Putin who 
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brought Aliev and Kocharian together on the sidelines of the CIS summit on 25 
January for the first time since the assassinations. After the meeting, Putin told 
journalists that Russia was ready to serve as a guarantor of a settlement. 
(INTERFAX, 27 Jan 00; via lexis-nexis)  
 
In marked contrast to last year when the US promoted the bilateral dialogue, 
Russia has emerged as the new broker of the presidential talks. These talks and 
the meeting of the four Caucasian states, held for the first time at the January 
CIS summit and due to be held again at the April summit, threaten to eclipse the 
international initiatives, the new Stability Pact project and the existing OSCE 
Minsk Group. A second meeting of the two presidents was held on the sidelines 
of the Davos economic summit on 30 January. That session produced only 
vague promises to hold more talks and prompted Azerbaijani Foreign Minister 
Vilayat Guliev to comment that Armenia still seems unprepared to continue the 
negotiations, "this meeting showed once again that Armenia has not got over the 
shock caused by the events of 27th October." (TREND NEWS AGENCY, 1609 
GMT, 3 Feb 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Although the meetings may have resumed, the radical demands and tense 
political environment in Yerevan will probably prohibit any progress along that 
route. Last week the very influential union of Nagorno-Karabakh war veterans, 
Yerkrapah, announced it would oppose any settlement "that entails the return to 
Azerbaijani jurisdiction of occupied Azerbaijani territories bordering on the 
unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh republic." (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 8 Feb 00) This 
suggests that the Yerkrapah leadership claims not only the Nagorno-Karabakh 
area but also the indisputably Azerbaijani districts that border it -- Azerbaijani 
areas which Armenian forces have been occupying since the cease-fire of 1994. 
Moreover the group insists on having a veto over any settlement plan and a 
national referendum on the issue. Prime Minister Aram Sarkisian agreed that no 
peace deal can be adopted without Yerkrapah's approval, while deputy 
parliamentary speaker Tigran Torosian suggested that any plan must be put to 
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public debate. It seems that Yerevan's most powerful political factions have 
gotten behind a position on the occupied territories which is guaranteed to breed 
resentment in Baku. 
 
Since the assassinations, the military wing --Yerkrapah and its political 
representation, the Republican Party, which is part of the ruling coalition 
Miasnutiun -- has emerged as the major political force in opposition to the 
president. Immediately after the assassinations, the military had presented the 
president with suggestions for his new cabinet. That demand was not met but a 
military prosecutor was charged with carrying out the investigation to placate 
some of the criticism from that quarter. In December, a Yerkrapah congress 
called for the president's resignation. That call was echoed in January by Vazgen 
Manukian, the leader of the National Democratic Union and a contender in the 
1996 and 1998 presidential elections. The idea of early presidential elections met 
with approval from several other opposition figures who had opposed such calls 
in December. (IWPR'S CAUCASUS REPORTING SERVICE, 28 Jan 00) 
Although so far Kocharian has managed to remain in his post, some very astute 
analysts believe that new elections are only being postponed until the Miasnutiun 
parliamentary coalition can find a suitable candidate. (RFE/RL CAUCASUS 
REPORT, 28 Jan 00) 
 
In the meantime, the military prosecutor arrested six more persons in January, 
bringing the total to 20, based ostensibly on the testimony of the assassins in his 
custody. (NOYAN TAPAN, 1324 GMT, 10 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0111, via 
World News Connection) Among the suspects are several associates of the 
president, including a presidential aide, Aleksan Arutyunyan. The arrests of 
influential members of the president's circle fuel the popular speculation that 
Kocharian and his entourage were behind the assassinations. At the same time, 
Prosecutor Gagik Dzhangirian told reporters the terrorist act may have 
represented the first phase of an attempted coup. (NOYAN TAPAN, 0600 GMT, 
13 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0113, via World News Connection) This seems like a 
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very odd scenario. Why would Kocharian sponsor a coup against himself? He 
lost political clout in domestic politics as a direct result of these events and his 
diplomatic initiative on Nagorno-Karabakh was scuttled. Unless some new 
evidence is revealed, this version seems unpersuasive -- the ostensible culprit 
lacks a motive. Others, like Vafa Guluzade, the former national security advisor 
to Aliev, advance a different view and suggest that Russian interests were behind 
the assassination. (See Vafa Guluzade "Russia, Turkey and Caucasian Stability," 
at http://www.cacianalyst.org/Forum%20sums.htm) This version seems more 
logical: The military and its Russian sponsors used the terrorist act to cower the 
president, just when the negotiations over Nagorno-Karabakh were beginning to 
bear fruit, and press for their own militant stand on Nagorno-Karabakh. 
 
The manner in which the investigation into the parliamentary slaying has been 
carried out is perhaps even more troubling than the attacks on the president. 
Obshchaya gazeta reported that masked men burst into a parliament session to 
drag off a presidential aide. The paper compared the proceedings to the great 
purge of 1937. The parallel is an apt one. The investigation proceeds in total 
secrecy; the military holds suspects for months and makes arrests based entirely 
on their testimony. One newspaper editor was arrested because his name was 
mentioned by a suspect. He was released when it was proven that he was out of 
the country on 27 October. As it turns out, the evidence against him consisted of 
the claim that he had commissioned an article from one of the assassins. 
(OBSHCHAYA GAZETA, 13 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0114, via World News 
Connection) 
 
The military prosecutor added another creepy undertone when he hinted at a 
possible link between the assassinations and the Vano Siradegian trial. (NOYAN 
TAPAN, 0600 GMT, 13 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0113, via World News 
Connection) IWPR referred to those proceedings against the former MVD 
minister and 11 other defendants as a "show trial." (IWPR CAUCASUS 
REPORTING SERVICE, 4 Feb 00 ) It might be possible to imagine some strange 
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scenario by which this case, which dates back five years, has some bearing on 
the October 1999 events, but such concoctions bear an even stronger 
resemblance to 1937, when prosecutors uncovered vast conspiracies to terrify 
the population and annihilate the opposition. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
KYRGYZSTAN 
Upcoming Kyrgyz elections unlikely to be free and fair 
Perhaps inspired by Uzbek President Karimov's practices, the Kyrgyz 
government has barred a number of opposition parties from participating in the 
parliamentary elections, due to be held on 20 February. Opposition party 
members have also complained of harassment by local officials, who refuse to 
register certain candidates or prevent party members from holding meetings. 
(KABAR NEWS AGENCY, 1334 GMT, 10 Feb 00; BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, via lexis-nexis) The Central Election Commission claims that a number of 
parties have provided inaccurate information about their candidates' incomes, 
which makes them ineligible to run for office. (KABAR NEWS AGENCY, 1124 
GMT, 26 Jan 00; BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, via lexis-nexis) Furthermore, 
criminal proceedings have begun against three prominent opposition figures, Ar-
Namys (Dignity) Party chairman Feliks Kulov, parliament deputy Ishenbai 
Kadyrbekov (one of the founders of the Social-Democratic Party), and chairman 
of the (Poor and Unprotected) People's Party, Daniyar Usenov. Usenov is the 
only one who has been arrested thus far, even though the charges against him 
seem to be the least serious: failure to obey a court summons for a case which 
was brought against him in 1996 and has since been closed. (RFE/RL 
NEWSLINE, 21 Jan 00) 
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The Kyrgyz government's actions are quite consistent with the methods 
employed by both the Uzbek and Kazakh regimes during their recent elections, in 
order to prevent the opposition from challenging the status quo. The Uzbek 
election authorities' actions were the most extreme, denying any role whatsoever 
to the opposition, whereas Kazakh authorities simply weeded out the most 
popular and well-known opposition parties, but allowed the weaker, less-
threatening factions to participate.  
 
Thus far, Kyrgyz authorities seem to prefer the Kazakh election model; as of 7 
February, nine parties had been permitted to register their candidates for 
parliament and at least four parties had been denied a place on the ballot, 
including Ar-Namys and (Poor and Unprotected) People's Party, two of the most 
popular parties. Oddly enough, however, the two largest opposition parties, the 
Communist parties, are being allowed to participate in the elections, although 
their candidates may only run in single-member districts. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 
11 Jan 00) Perhaps what President Akaev fears most is not a challenge from the 
left, whose sympathizers are most likely to be found among the older 
generations, but a challenge from those candidates who base their appeal on 
nationalist platforms. Feliks Kulov, chairman of Ar-Namys, has singled out 
Kyrgyzstan's Russian minority for support, promising to work to reinstate Russian 
as one of Kyrgyzstan's official languages, as well as to provide maximum 
representation not only for Russians, but for all of the country's ethnic minorities. 
(RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 6 Jan 00) During a period when inter-ethnic tensions are 
rising in Kyrgyzstan, any opposition candidate's ability to appeal to a wide range 
of groups undoubtedly poses a significant threat to those who currently hold 
power. Kulov's willingness to form blocs with other opposition parties could have 
guaranteed the opposition a significant share of parliament seats. Apparently this 
was not a prospect that President Akaev's government was willing to tolerate. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
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By Kate Martin 
 
Spies, spies everywhere... 
Russia, a country known to be shocked when confronted with evidence of 
intelligence-gathering activities, has been waging a campaign to warn of such 
activity by the Baltic states, a campaign that has become all the more 
pronounced since former spymaster Vladimir Putin was named acting president. 
The campaign not only has highlighted intelligence work by Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania, but also pointed to the "man behind the curtain," so to speak, that is, 
the West and, in particular, the United States. 
 
Thus, ITAR-TASS correspondents reported that the Baltic states "are assuming a 
front-line role in gathering intelligence for NATO," and the Central Intelligence 
Agency "is reportedly coordinating [Latvia's] intelligence efforts." In addition, 
ITAR-TASS reports, "the work of some of Latvia's special services is being 
directed by the intelligence services of Scandinavian countries and in particular 
Sweden." (ITAR-TASS, 1103 GMT, 24 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0124, via World 
News Connection) 
 
A subsequent ITAR-TASS report concluded that more than 450 Estonians have 
been training in intelligence centers in the West and that "analysis of forms and 
methods used by the Estonian secret service makes one think that they closely 
interact with colleagues from Great Britain, Denmark, the United States, 
Germany and Sweden in intelligence efforts on Russia." (ITAR-TASS, 1923 
GMT, 28 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0128, via World News Connection) So, not 
only are there spies in them there Baltic states, but they're not even Baltic spies. 
They're varmints from the West. 
 
The deputy chief of the Federal Security Services (FSB) Reconnaissance 
Service in Kaliningrad noted "the resurrection by Lithuanian secret services in the 
Russian enclave's border regions" had been evident since last year, and that the 
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Lithuanian and Polish surveillance activities can be linked with the influence of 
NATO and cross-Atlantic partners. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 
1100 GMT, 3 Feb 00) 
 
It is unclear what reaction, if any, on the international front the Russian 
government expected from such reports. One doubts that Estonian Prime 
Minister Mart Laar's response was anywhere near what was anticipated. Noting 
the propaganda offensive the Russian media have been waging, Laar gleefully 
retorted that "I would be much more concerned if the development of such 
Estonia structures didn't cause headache to anyone. That would be a sign that 
they are no match for the opposite side." (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY 
REPORT, 1100 GMT, 3 Feb 00) 
 
A cynic might attribute the motivation behind Russia's official news agency's 
repeated representations of the Baltic states as, essentially, three stooges of the 
West as either an undisguised attempt to feed the country's growing "us versus 
the West" rhetoric in preparation for the coronation of the now acting president, 
or to disarm (for domestic audiences) Western calls to stop the bombardment of 
Chechnya. A cynic might also ask how the Russian government obtained such 
facts ... if not by spying itself.  
 
Meanwhile, as Russia proclaimed its outrage about spying in the present tense, it 
was less willing to discuss spying in the past tense. Last month Latvian Prime 
Minister Andris Skele reiterated his views of the need to publicize names of 
former KGB employees, sparking renewed parliamentary debate about the ways 
and means, advantages and disadvantages, of such a move. (BNS, 1319 GMT, 
25 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0125, via World News Connection) An unscientific 
poll of parliamentary factions concerning the initiative of Skele's People's Party 
demonstrated that the idea generates little enthusiasm, primarily because of the 
incompleteness and unverifiability of the files. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY 
REPORT, 1400 GMT, 27 Jan 00) 
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Spies and Nazis and Bolsheviks -- oh my 
Former KGB agents were not the only blast from the past heard in the Baltic 
region lately. There has also been a resurgence of hate-mongering, in the form of 
National Socialist and Bolshevik political parties. 
 
While the KGB files may or may not remain closed, war crimes must be 
investigated, the Baltic states were told by a US official attending last month's 
international forum on the Holocaust in Stockholm. "It is very important for the 
Baltic countries to bring their war criminals to justice," US Deputy Secretary of 
the Treasury Stuart Eizenstat told journalists. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY 
REPORT, 1400 GMT, 28 Jan 00) And Baltic leaders are listening. With the 
recent mobility of Konrad Kalejs, an Australian citizen of Latvian origin who is 
suspected of having committed war crimes as an officer in the Arajs Kommando, 
international attention has been increasingly focused on Baltic inability to 
prosecute suspected war criminals. 
 
The Kalejs case has caused Latvia untold amount of grief, and warranted an 
official statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which simultaneously 
trumpeted the country's belief in the need for international justice and laid the 
foundation for an alibi should such justice be unachievable: " Latvia regards 
crimes against humanity as crimes without a statute of limitations. Latvia is ready 
to prosecute persons whose guilt in the above-mentioned crimes is proved in 
accordance with national and international legislation. However, no one in the 
Republic of Latvia can today be prosecuted on the basis of suspicion and without 
comprehensive evidence as was often the case during the totalitarian regimes of 
Nazis and Soviets." (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1900 GMT, 7 
Jan 00) It will be surprising if a lack of evidence holds back the prosecution of 
Kalejs, however. The US Department of Justice has made its records accessible, 
and material is also provided by Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom. In 
addition, the director of the Jerusalem office of the Simon Wiesenthal Center, 
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Efraim Zuroff, reported that the center had submitted a list of seven potential 
witnesses, former members of the Arajs Kommando who were convicted by 
Soviet authorities and are living in Latvia. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY 
REPORT, 1400 GMT, 3 Feb 00) 
 
Another person charged with war crimes, Vassily Kononov, has been convicted. 
Kononov, the first person prosecuted for war crimes since the restoration of 
Latvia's independence, denied any guilt associated with the killing of civilians in 
the village of Mazie Bati in 1944. According to the charges, 18 Soviet partisans 
dressed in German army uniforms shot or burned alive all the villagers. Kononov 
based his plea of innocence on the belief that he had been fighting as a partisan 
against enemies in special circumstances: "During the war time there [is] wartime 
law. If you don't shoot the enemy the enemy will shoot you," he said. (BALTIC 
NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1100 GMT, 17 Jan 00) The Riga District 
Court found Kononov guilty nonetheless, and sentenced him to six years in 
prison -- one-half the time requested by the prosecutor. (BALTIC NEWS 
SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1900 GMT, 21 Jan 00) 
 
Meanwhile, the current activities of two groups have been catching the attention 
of authorities. A search of apartments of several members belonging to members 
of the radical National Bolshevik party in Riga has resulted in criminal charges, 
although at the moment such charges are relatively minor. The group reportedly 
has ties with the National Bolshevik party in Russia. The case was opened over 
the assault of the honor and integrity of law enforcement officers, but other 
charges may be added, according to a spokesman for the Ministry of the Interior. 
(BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1400 GMT, 3 Feb 00) 
 
In Lithuania, the head of the unregistered National Socialist Unity Union, 
Mindaugas Murza, appears to be having more luck getting near the ballot than 
his party is having, at least for the time being. According to media reports, Murza 
plans to run for a seat on the city council of Siauliai. According to the head of the 
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Central Electoral Commission (CEC), there are no obstacles so far for members 
of the party to participate in the elections through the list of another party. "We 
cannot decide on Murza's participation in the elections until [we] receive the 
documents," CEC director Zenonas Vaigauskas said. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE 
DAILY REPORT, 1400 GMT, 28 Jan 00) Moreover, while the Lithuanian Ministry 
of Justice repeatedly has rejected the National Socialist Union's requests to be 
registered as a political party, the Supreme Administrative Court ruled earlier this 
month that the ministry must consider the Union's charter and registration 
application once more. (INTERFAX, 1413 GMT, 5 Feb 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-
0205, via World News Connection) 
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